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JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOUTH
AFRICA’S NEW BUSINESS RESCUE
MODEL: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
Patrick C. Osode
INTRODUCTION
One of the most exciting and innovative aspects of South
Africa’s New Companies Act1 (“the 2008 Companies Act” or “the
Act”) is the creation of a new business rescue model in Chapter Six of
the Act (“Chapter Six”). The scheme of Chapter Six of the 2008
Companies Act2 replaces the judicial management model that was
contained in the 1973 Companies Act,3 which is the predecessor of the
current Act. Like most major pieces of legislation enacted in postapartheid South Africa, the 2008 Companies Act in general, and
Chapter Six in particular, are intended by the legislature to significantly
enlarge the capacities of both the government and the private sector
 This is the revised version of a paper presented at the 17th Biennial
Meeting of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law (IACCL)
held at Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey from July 16-19, 2014. Excellent research
assistance received from Melissa A.A. Omino, doctoral candidate, University of Fort
Hare, is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any error or omission remains
exclusively mine.
 LLB (Hons); BL; LLM; SJD. Professor and Head, Department of
Mercantile Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa.
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (S. Afr.). Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to statutory provisions are references to provisions of this Act. Although
enacted in 2008, the Act only came into force on May 1, 2011. Pursuant to powers
conferred under the Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry has enacted The
Companies Regulations, 2011 which are expected to assist both the application and
implementation. See GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 April 2011 (S. Afr.).
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.).
3 Companies Act 61 of 1973 (S. Afr.). The 1973 Companies Act has now
been repealed by the 2008 Companies Act.

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

to preserve existing jobs, create new employment opportunities, and
make the country’s economy competitive relative to its
contemporaries.4 But beyond the purely economic policy objectives,
the 2008 Companies Act was also intended to infuse the regulatory
framework governing companies with the treasured democratic values
of equality, non-racialism, and human dignity enshrined in South
Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution.5
The fact that both social and economic objectives impelled the
enactment of the 2008 Companies Act and Chapter Six can be gleaned
from the twelve objects of the Act set out in section 7. With particular
respect to Chapter Six, it is specifically stated that part of the policy
intent behind the enactment of the Act is “to provide for the efficient
rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner
that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.”6
Especially significant is the provision of section 5(1) of the 2008
Companies Act, which explicitly enjoins the courts to interpret and
apply the provisions of the Act in a manner that gives effect to the
purposes set out in section 7. Based on the provisions of sections 5, 7,
and Chapter Six, both judges and academics7 are in agreement that the
legislature has unequivocally signalled its preference for the rescue of
financially distressed companies as against liquidation.8 Both the 2008
Companies Act and Chapter Six constitute another glaring example of
South Africa’s attempt to use commercial legal regulatory instruments
4
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES
CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, ¶ 1.2 (2004), available at
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26493_gen1183a.pdf.
5 S. AFR. CONST., 2008.
6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.).
7 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW 861-64 (Farouk H.I. Cassim et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2012); 1 HENOCHSBERG ON THE COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 44-46 (Piet
Delport et al. eds. 2012) [hereinafter “DELPORT”].
8 This point was made most distinctly by the court in Koen and Another v.
Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S.
Afr.) as follows: “It is clear that the Legislature has recognised that the liquidation of
companies more frequently than not occasions significant collateral damage, both
economically and socially, with attendant destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is
obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such adverse
socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where reasonably possible. Business
rescue is intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed at
avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations . . . .”
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to boost socio-economic transformation by creating conditions that
will enable significantly increased participation of the formerly
disenfranchised black majority in the mainstream economy. These
reforms will help the society overcome the multiple legacies of
apartheid with which South Africa continues to struggle twenty years
into the democratic era.
The quality of real or tangible outcomes achieved by statutory
regulatory instruments generally, and commercial law-related
instruments in particular, may depend in part on their interpretation
and application by the courts.9 To be sure, the adoption of an
interpretive approach that is conservative, largely textual or literal, and
purpose-neutral will significantly undermine the prospect of Chapter
Six achieving the public policy goals intended by law and policymakers.
Indeed, such an approach may by itself lead to regulatory failure.10 The
plausibility of this concern is clearly borne out by the experience of
“judicial management” in the courts. In this respect, it is especially
noteworthy that virtually all of the academic and judicial post-mortem
done on the judicial management scheme of the 1973 Companies Act
suggest that one of the main reasons for the dismal failure of that
scheme was the conservative judicial approach to the interpretation
and application of the requirement of “reasonable probability” (of
successful financial rehabilitation of the debtor company), which was
a prerequisite for the granting of a judicial management order under
section 417 of that Act.11 The risk of business rescue suffering the same
9
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 378-79
(Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds. 2013).
10 Such failure would almost certainly become reality if the courts adopt a
disposition and develop a jurisprudence that is generally “creditor-friendly,” as was
the case in the judicial management era and as is still the case under the country’s
insolvency law and related processes. It should be noted here that judicial
management was first introduced into South African law through the Companies Act
of 1926 and only became consigned to history when the 2008 Companies Act came
into force. See Richard Bradstreet, The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim?,
128 SALJ 352, 353-56 (2011); Anneli Loubser, The Role of Shareholders during Corporate
Rescue Proceedings: Always On the Outside Looking In?, 20 SAMLJ 372, 372-73 (2008).
11 See, e.g., David Burdette, Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern
and Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1), 16 SAMLJ 249 (2004);
CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 2; Pieter Kloppers, Judicial
Management Reform – Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue, 13 SAMLJ 358 (2001); Koen and
Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at 2

461

2015

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:1

fate in the courts as its judicial management predecessor is significantly
heightened by the deficiencies of the 2008 Companies Act generally
and of Chapter Six in particular.12
Against the above background, it is clear that the interpretive
approach and attitude of the courts will be critical to the efficacy of the
Chapter Six rescue mechanism and, therefore, to the attainment of the
underlying public policy objectives. Without doubt, if they adopt an
(S. Afr.); Anneli Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South
African Corporate Law, 16 SAMLJ 137 (2004); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others
v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); Propspec
Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.). Other
factors that have been identified include the absence of a business rescue culture
among all the various role players (creditors, judges, etc.) and the fact that judicial
managers were usually chosen from the ranks of liquidators who have neither the
skill nor experience in rehabilitating businesses. See Richard Bradstreet, The Leak in
the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue Practitioners May Adversely
Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the Economy, 22 SAMLJ 195, 195 (2010). It
would seem that there were also historical factors that lay behind the spectacular
impotence and ultimate failure of judicial management. See Anneli Loubser, Tilting
at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, 25
SAMLJ 437, 438 (2011).
12 In this respect, the following points are noteworthy. First, consisting of
a total of 225 sections and 5 schedules, the 2008 Companies Act is about the shortest
contemporary companies’ legislation. It can in this respect be sharply contrasted with
the United Kingdom 2006 Companies Act, which consists of 1300 sections and 16
schedules; Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 made up of 1516 sections and 4
schedules; Hong Kong’s Companies Ordinance 2012, which consists of 921 sections
and 11 schedules; and India’s Companies Act 2013 consisting of 470 sections and 7
schedules. However, the interpretation and application of the Act is supported by
the Companies Regulations of 2011 made by the Minister of Trade and Industry
pursuant to powers conferred by Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 223 (S. Afr.). As
already pointed out by some academic commentators and as the emerging case law
is beginning to show, the result of this extreme minimalist approach and economy
of content is that several important issues of company law are either not covered at
all or are addressed in significantly inadequate detail. See CONTEMPORARY COMPANY
LAW, supra note 7, at 2; PIET DELPORT, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT MANUAL 3-4
(2009); Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South African
Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 137. Second, the deficit in the width of regulatory
coverage is exacerbated by the poor quality of legislative drafting apparent in several
parts of the 2008 Companies Act. This has already been the subject of judicial
lamentation in the emerging case law. See also DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and
Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.) and Tuning Fork Ltd. t/a Balanced Audio v. Greeff and
Another 2014 (4) SA 521, ¶ 90 (S. Afr.).
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approach and attitude similar to that which was consistently visited on
“judicial management,” there is a real likelihood that the rescue
mechanism will fail at the judicial altar. Cognisant of this possibility,
this paper examines some of the Chapter Six related decisions and
pronouncements made by South African courts in the last three years,
with a view to assessing the practical or policy implications of those
decisions and pronouncements. The analysis will determine whether
the decisions are ultimately favourable to the emergence of Chapter
Six as an effective corporate rescue mechanism in South Africa.
I.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH
AFRICA’S CORPORATE RESCUE MODEL

The scheme of Chapter Six can be activated in either one of
two ways. The first is by way of a resolution adopted by the board of
directors of a “financially distressed company” where the directors
genuinely believe that the company is “financially distressed”13 and that
there is a reasonable prospect of rescue.14 Alternatively, where the
board of such a company appears reluctant to adopt such a resolution,
and thereby activates business rescue proceedings voluntarily, any
“affected person”15 may apply to the court for an order placing the
In terms of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(f) (S. Afr.), a company
is “financially distressed” if, within the immediately ensuing six-month period, (a) it
appears reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as
they become due and payable; or (b) it appears reasonably likely that the company
will become insolvent.
14 “Rescuing a company” is defined as the achievement of either one of
two goals, namely, (a) the restructuring of the affairs, business, property, equity, debt,
and other liabilities of a financially distressed company in a manner that maximizes
the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, (b) if it
is not possible for the company to continue in existence, results in a better return to
the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate
liquidation of the company. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(b)(iii), 128(1)(h)
(S. Afr.).
15 In relation to a company, the term “affected person” refers to the
shareholders or creditors, trade unions representing the company’s employees, the
employees themselves, or their representatives where they are not represented by a
trade union. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(a), 144 (S. Afr.). The
recognition of trade unions and employees and the vesting of significant rights on
them in the corporate rescue context is one of the innovations introduced by the
2008 Companies Act and is consistent with South African law and policymakers’
13
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company under rescue.16 Irrespective of how the proceedings are
commenced, the first major consequence is that the business and
affairs are placed under the supervision and control of a “business
rescue practitioner” to whom all the “affected persons” must now look
for the possible rehabilitation of the company.17
The second major legal consequence flowing from the
commencement of business rescue proceedings is the moratorium on
legal proceedings, executions, and claims (secured and unsecured)
against the company.18 This effectively insulates a company undergoing
rescue from legal or enforcement proceedings either pending or in
prospect.19 The moratorium, which is general in its reach, arises both
immediately and automatically upon the proper commencement of the
said proceedings.20 While the effect of the moratorium does not extend
to an alteration of existing rights acquired by the company’s creditors
in the period preceding business rescue, it does effectively freeze those
rights “in the sense that creditors may not enforce their rights while
the company is under the rescue process without the written consent
of the business rescue practitioner or in certain circumstances, the
court[.]”21

conviction that these particular stakeholders deserve stronger protection in processes
and transactions aimed at resolving challenges posed by financially distressed
employers. See CARL STEIN & GEOFF EVERINGHAM, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT
UNLOCKED 411 (2011).
16
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 129(1) (S. Afr.).
17 In this respect, although the South African business rescue scheme
shares several features with the famous 11 U.S.C. § 1101 corporate bankruptcy
management regime, it also differs sharply in that it adopts what Professor
McCormack has described as a “management displacement model” when compared
to the “debtor-in-possession” model of 11 U.S.C. § 1101. See GERARD MCCORMACK,
CORPORATE RESCUE LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 80-83, 152-54
(2008). See also CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861, 866; STEIN &
EVERINGHAM, supra note 15, at 409.
18 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 133 (S. Afr.).
19 This feature appears common to most of the corporate rescue schemes
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 156-175.
20
CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 878-79.
21 Id. 878-79. In the recent case of Moodley v. On Digital Media (Pty) Ltd. 2014
(6) SA 279 (GJ) (S. Afr.), the court held that the scope of the said general moratorium
does not extend to legal proceedings brought against a company under business
rescue and its business rescue practitioner in connection with the rescue plan,
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Perhaps the most crucial part of the business rescue process
consists of the development, approval, and implementation of a
competent rescue plan.22 Inevitably, exclusive responsibility for this
part of the process is imposed on the practitioner who must begin his
tenure by simultaneously investigating the company’s affairs and
consulting with the creditors, management, employees or their trade
unions, and other stakeholders.23 Following development of the plan,
it must be presented for approval of the creditors at a meeting which
is also open to participation by other groups of “affected persons.” 24
A rescue plan is only “approved” if it is supported by seventy-five
percent of the creditors out of which fifty percent must be claimants
who qualify as “independent creditors.”25 Implementation of the plan
can only be properly embarked upon by the business rescue
practitioner if approval has been given in accordance with the
requirements of the 2008 Companies Act.26 If the required level of
creditor support for the plan is not received, the rescue proceedings
automatically terminate, unless the practitioner or an “affected person”
pursues the very limited recourse available to him under the Act.27

including its interpretation and execution towards implementation. In reaching this
decision, the court declined to follow an earlier high court decision to the contrary
handed down in Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v. Marsden No and Others 2013
ZAGPJHC 148 (GSJ) (S. Afr.).
22
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1) (S. Afr.).
23
Id. § 141(1). However, there is an obligation imposed on directors by
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 142 (S. Afr.) to provide assistance and cooperation to
the business rescue practitioner.
24 Id. § 152 (S. Afr.). For a detailed discussion of the various stakeholders’
participatory rights, see CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 899-905;
and DELPORT, supra note 7, at 500-14.
25 The term “independent creditor” is defined by Companies Act 71 of
2008 § 128(1)(g) (S. Afr.) as a creditor, including an employee, who is not related to
the debtor company. It specifically excludes the company’s directors as well as the
business rescue practitioner.
26 Id. § 152(5), (6). These provisions impose a mandatory obligation on the
debtor company, under the direction of the business rescue practitioner, to take all
steps necessary to satisfy any conditions on which the rescue plan is contingent and
to implement the plan.
27 Where a plan is rejected by the creditors, there are essentially two
options available under Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1) (S. Afr.). The first is for
either the business rescue practitioner or an “affected person” to make an application
to court for an order setting aside the creditors’ negative vote on the basis that it was
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ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE

Since the 2008 Companies Act came into operation on the May
1, 2011, there have been no less than fifteen reported judicial decisions
on business rescue applications and resulting or related proceedings.
For the purposes of this paper, it is especially significant that business
rescue appears to have been granted in only one of the cases that have
come before the courts.28 Consistent with sound judicial practice, the
courts have taken the opportunity in each case to make decisions and
pronouncements on several questions pivotal in the context of the
interpretation, application, and implementation of Chapter Six. In the
discussion that follows below, this paper discusses the judicial
decisions and pronouncements on some of those questions.
A.

What Constitutes a “Reasonable Prospect of Rescue”

The most recurring questions in the emerging case law pertain
to the provision empowering a court to grant an order, at the behest
of an “affected person,” placing a company under business rescue
where, inter alia, “there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the
company.”29 Not surprisingly, this provision also featured prominently
in the two cases on business rescue that have thus far reached the
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”).30 The first question that the courts
have had to confront in this context, is as to what exactly the legislature
meant by the words “reasonable prospect of rescue.” Indeed, most of
the applications for business rescue made thus far have failed mainly
on the ground that the applicants were unable to meet the evidentiary
“inappropriate.” The second option is for an “affected person” or “combination of
affected persons” to make an offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more
of the opposing creditors at a value independently and expertly determined to be a
fair and reasonable estimate of the return to the said creditor(s) if the company were
to be liquidated.
28 That solitary case is African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.).
29 Id. § 131(4)(a).
30 See Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami)
Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); and the very recent (and yet to be reported)
decision in Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA
162. The SCA of South Africa is the highest court in South Africa for all matters
except those raising constitutional questions for which the Constitutional Court
(where the Chief Justice sits) is the apex court.
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burden implicit in this requirement.31 For supporters and enthusiasts
of business rescue in South Africa, these “pioneering” High Court and
SCA judgments32 must be troubling, partly because of the
overwhelmingly negative findings and conclusions which point to the
possibility that the courts might be unwittingly setting the bar too high
for the applicants and in the process unfairly denying access to the
remedial potential of the Chapter Six statutory scheme for financially
distressed companies and their stakeholders.33 In this regard the
decision in Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm
Investments 386 Ltd.34 stands out. Here the court began the articulation
of the basis for its decision by noting that the 2008 Companies Act
clearly requires something less than that the debtor company’s
rehabilitation should be a reasonable probability. This, in the court’s
view, is an inference that must be drawn from the difference in
language between the 1973 Companies Act which used the words
“reasonable probability” in its s 417 and the 2008 Companies Act
where the words used in section 131(4) are “reasonable prospect”. In
other words, the legislature must have intended to set the rehabilitation
bar at a level lower than that prescribed under the 1973 Companies
Act. The court was especially critical of the judicial approach to
applications for “judicial management” when it stated that, “the
mindset reflected in various cases dealing with judicial management
See E.P. Joubert, “Reasonable Possibility” versus “Reasonable Prospect”: Did
Business Rescue Succeed in Creating a Better Test than Judicial Management?, 76 J. Contemp.
Roman-Dutch L. 550, 562 (2013) (observing that, based on the recent case law, “the
single most problematic factor that stands in the way of the granting of business
rescue orders, is the uncertainty experienced by the courts regarding the meaning of
‘reasonable prospect.’”).
32 See Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors Intervening)
2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa
(Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.); Engen Petroleum Ltd. v. Multi Waste (Pty)
Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 596 (S. Afr.); Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd. v. Pinnacle Point
Group Ltd. and Another, (Advantage Projects Managers) (Pty) Ltd. Intervening 2011 (5) SA
600 (S. Afr.); Essa and Another v. Bestvest and Another 2012 (4) SA 103; Investec Bank Ltd.
v. Bruyns 2011 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.); Nedbank Ltd. v. Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd. 2012
(5) SA 497 (S. Afr.); Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd. t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd. v.
Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd. 2012 (4) SA 590 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
33 Joubert, supra note 31, at 563.
34 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd.
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.). The decision and reasoning in this case was
followed in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2)
SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
31
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applications in respect of the recovery requirement was that, prima facie,
the creditor was entitled to a liquidation order, and that only in
exceptional circumstances would a judicial management order be
granted.”35
Having made the above points regarding the significance of the
difference in the wording of sections 131(4) and 417, the court in
Southern Palace Investments seems to have lost its course when it not only
held that, in order to satisfy the lower threshold, the business rescue
applicant must provide a business plan that:
Addresses the cause of the demise or failure of the debtor
company’s business and offers a remedy that has a reasonable prospect
of being sustainable;
Provides concrete and objectively ascertainable details of:
The likely costs of making the company able to resume its
business;
The likely availability of the necessary cash resources to enable
the debtor company to meet its day-to-day expenses upon resumption
of its operations;
The availability of any other resources; and
The reasons why the applicant suggests that the proposed
business plan would have a reasonable prospect of success.36
Having indicated that the legislative intent behind the wording
of section 131(4) was to set the bar lower than was the case in the
“judicial management” era, the court in Southern Palace Investments ended
up setting the bar even higher. But perhaps more troubling is the fact
that the court’s reasoning, with due respect, drifted into the realm of
blatant error when it decided to impose, by implication, the duty to
develop and present a sound and detailed rescue plan upon the
applicant—for this is a duty that is expressly imposed on the business

35
36

See Southern Palace Investments, 2012 (2) SA 423 at para. 21.
Id.
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rescue practitioner by the pertinent provisions of Chapter Six.37
Furthermore, in terms of the minimum three months timeline that the
Act allows for the practitioner to attempt successful rehabilitation of a
financially distressed company, a careful reading of the pertinent
provisions38 would seem to suggest that the practitioner has a
minimum of four weeks, subsequent to her appointment, within which
to develop the rescue plan. But perhaps more worrisome is the fact
that the courts in Southern Palace Investments and Koen v. Wedgewood39
found that it was fair and realistic to require an applicant for business
rescue to furnish a complete business rescue plan laden with the level
of detail spelled out in their judgments as part of the minimum required
to persuade a court to exercise its discretion in favour of an application
for corporate rescue. This is because a careful reflection on the profile
of stakeholders included in the definition of “affected persons” should
suggest that such business rescue applicants would have neither the
company-specific information nor the resources required to produce a
competent rescue plan at the time of making the application under
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act. The view and attitude adopted
by the courts in the above two cases smacks of judicial apathy towards
business rescue applicants which does not bode well for the future of
the Chapter Six rescue mechanism.
It is against the above background that the SCA’s decision in
Oakdene Square Properties40 really does make a welcome entry into the
corpus of the emerging South African business rescue jurisprudence.41
In Oakdene Square Properties, the applicants for business rescue, having
failed in the high court, argued before the SCA that the requirement of
a “reasonable prospect” for rescuing the company in section 131(4)
demands no more than a reasonable prospect of development and
delivery of a rescue plan (by a business rescue practitioner). According
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1)(d)(i) (S. Afr.). It is both surprising
and unfortunate that the decision in Southern Palace Investments was followed without
reservation in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012
(2) SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
38 Companies Act 71 of 2008 at § 132. The court is conferred with
discretion to allow a longer time on application made to it by the practitioner. See
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 132(3) (S. Afr.).
39 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64.
40 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.).
41 Joubert, supra note 31, at 562-63.
37
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to them, an applicant for business rescue is therefore not required to
show a reasonable prospect of achieving one of the two goals
contemplated in section 128(1)(b). On this reasoning, all that the
applicant is obliged to show is that “a plan to do so is capable of being
developed and implemented regardless of whether or not it may fail.”42
Furthermore, according to the applicants’ contention, once it is
established that a business rescue applicant’s intention is to develop
and implement a plan whose purpose is the rescue of the debtor
company, the court should grant the application even if it is skeptical
regarding the potential of the applicant’s plan to achieve the intended
outcome.43
The SCA rejected the applicants’ arguments in toto. It held that
the words “rescuing the company”—as used in section 128(1)(b)—
require the achievement of one of the alternative goals of business
rescue. To that extent, the Court found that the argument advanced by
the applicants “is in direct conflict with the express wording of
s[ection] 128(1)(h).”44 According to the SCA, on a careful reading of
section 128(1)(b), it is evident that the development of a plan cannot
be a goal in itself, but rather it can only be the means to an end which
“must be either to restore the company to a solvent going concern, or
at least to facilitate a better deal for creditors and shareholders than
they would secure from a liquidation process.”45 Therefore, the
evidentiary burden in the view of the SCA clearly lies on the business
rescue applicant to establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of
achieving one of the twin goals of section 128(1)(b).
Fraught with greater uncertainty, and therefore more
worrisome, is the practical question as to how the business rescue
applicant ought to discharge the said evidentiary burden. Should this
applicant present the court with a detailed business rescue plan? Or
should the applicant provide details of the likely costs enabling the
company to recommence its business? Or should the applicant present
42 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 31 (S. Afr.).
43 Id.
44 Id. It should be noted that while Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b)
(S. Afr.) defines the term “business rescue,” Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(h)
(S. Afr.) provides the definition of the term “rescuing the company.”
45 Id.
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details pertaining to the likely availability of the cash resources required
to enable the company to meet its day-to-day expenses? Or yet still, is
the applicant required to provide concrete factual details of the
source(s), nature, and extent of the resources that are likely to be
available to the company as well as the terms on which such resources
will be made available? In its decision on this practical question,46 the
SCA made it crystal clear that a business rescue applicant is not
required to present a detailed rescue plan. However, an applicant must
present “more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable
possibility.”47 In this respect, mere speculative suggestions and vague
averments will not suffice.48 According to the SCA, what is required of
an applicant is to establish the “reasonable grounds” on which she
believes that there is a possibility of rescuing the company. Implicit in
the court’s decision here is that the applicant must provide a factual
basis for the said grounds. Very significantly, however, the SCA held
that it would be both impractical and imprudent to prescribe the
manner in which business rescue applicants must meet this evidentiary
burden in every case. Accordingly, to the extent that the courts in
Southern Palace Investments49 and Koen v. Wedgewood50 sought to do so, they
erred.
In setting the bar for the applicant regarding what is required
to discharge the said evidentiary obligation, much judicial caution and
circumspection is required. This is because if the bar is set too high,
the practical effect will be devastating for the new business rescue
regime and the achievement of policy goals it has been enacted to
promote. Clearly, such a judicial approach will severely limit the
availability of business rescue proceedings through section 131 of the
2008 Companies Act. It is noteworthy that this particular danger and
the underlying concern has already been recognized by the high court
Id. ¶¶ 29-31. The SCA here approved and applied the approach adopted
by the High Court in Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4)
SA 539 (S. Afr.).
47 Id. ¶ 29.
48 Id. See also Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013
(4) SA 539 at para. 11 (S. Afr.).
49 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd.,
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
50 Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2)
SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S. Afr.).
46
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in Propspec Investments Ltd. and by the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties
where it essentially endorsed the approach and related comments of
van der Merwe J in Propspec Investments Ltd. The judges in both cases
were of one mind in the view that the bar ought to be set fairly low for
business rescue applicants, with a view favorable to maximizing the
availability and use of business rescue proceedings. In this respect, the
court in Propspec Investments Ltd.51 and the SCA in Oakdene Square
Properties52 seem to both recognize that a contrary judicial approach
would be effectively tantamount to judicial frustration of the real
prospects of attaining the legislative and policy objectives behind the
enactment of the Chapter Six provisions.53
The risk of business rescue becoming a victim of a judicial
approach that is not predisposed to magnanimity towards those
seeking to access the scheme is not far-fetched. This is because such a
judicial attitude may be easily justifiable as an appropriate response to
the real risk of abuse of business rescue proceedings by debtor
companies and/or their controllers involved in a pattern of conduct
clearly aimed at improperly defeating or delaying legitimate claims and
rights of innocent creditors.54
In some cases, such patterns of behavior have been
accompanied by evidence of misappropriation or abuse of company
funds, assets, and/or opportunities by the controller(s) of the debtor
company.55 In such cases, business rescue proceedings are simply
activated mala fides to allow the wrongdoing to continue for as long as
51 Bradstreet, supra note 10, at 353-56; Loubser, Tilting at Windmills? The
Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, supra note 11, at 372.
52 Id.
53 In this respect it is pleasing to note the recent SCA decision in Newcity
Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA 162, where the court
confirmed its approach and reasoning in Oakdene Square Properties.
54 This risk of abuse by company directors, majority shareholders and
other stakeholders has been recognized by other academic commentators. See, e.g.,
Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and
Questions (Part 1), 3 J. SOUTH AFRICAN L 501, 505 (2010); DELPORT, supra note 7, at
446; Michael Steiner, The Insolvency Bill 2000: Rescue Culture in the new Millennium, 15 J.
Int’l Banking L. 61, 62 (2000).
55 See, e.g., Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors
Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm
Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 29 (S. Afr.).

472

2015

Osode

4:1

possible to the maximum detriment of the company, creditors,
shareholders and other stakeholders. Such undesirable behavior and
tendencies on the part of directors and company controllers are readily
apparent from the factual findings of the courts in the cases of Oakdene
Square Properties,56 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow and
Others57 and Swart v. Beagles Run.58 Naturally, the public would expect
the courts to be very vigilant in ensuring that the Chapter Six
provisions are not invoked by company controllers or stakeholders
acting mala fides for purposes that have little to do with achieving the
underlying policy objectives but, instead, have all to do with wanting
to co-opt business rescue proceedings into premeditated elaborate and
illegal self-aggrandizing schemes capable of being perpetrated in the
corporate context.
It is in their zeal to prevent the abuse of the Chapter Six
provisions and related judicial processes that the courts may adopt
principled positions leading to an unintended consequence, namely, a
severe restriction of the availability of business rescue proceedings and
frustration of the underlying legislative and policy intent. This could in
turn lead to the business rescue model suffering the same fate as that
which befell judicial management under the 1973 Companies Act.
Against this background, the SCA decision in Oakdene Square Properties
and the pronouncements on the applicable legal principles in Propspec
Investments Ltd. must be applauded. Clearly, business rescue-related
matters brought before the courts in the coming years will be guided
by the pronouncements of legal principle made on this critical issue by
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties.

In Oakdene Square Properties, there was evidence of management
deadlock and related paralysis at the level of the board of directors resulting from the
active conduct of the two director-shareholders who were the applicants for business
rescue. In addition, the company had apparently been stripped of its sources of
income through questionable dealings with its main assets, which were done by one
of the said directors acting unilaterally without board approval but with the apparent
tacit support and collusion of his co-applicant.
57 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 131(4)(a) (S. Afr.).
58 Here, the facts accepted by the court showed that in the months
immediately preceding the business rescue application, the company had been
involved in a pattern of insolvent and fraudulent trading while under the control of
the sole director-shareholder who was the stakeholder behind the application.
56
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What Constitutes “Business Rescue” Under the Act

According to section 128, which is the opening definition
section of Chapter Six, “business rescue” means “proceedings to
facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed
by providing for”59 among others:
the development and implementation, if approved, of
a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its
affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities,
and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood
of the company continuing in existence on a solvent
basis or, if it is not possible for the company to so
continue in existence, results in a better return for the
company’s creditors or shareholders than would result
from the immediate liquidation of the company.60
In the academic discussions of this particular provision, there
seems to be consensus that business rescue proceedings are intended
by the legislature to have both a primary and a secondary objective—
rehabilitating the company so that it is able to continue to operate as a
solvent going concern being the primary goal, while rehabilitation for
the very limited purpose of securing better returns for creditors and
shareholders being secondary.61 The suggestion implicit in the
academic commentaries is that the proceedings must be initiated solely
for the attainment of the said primary purpose; and may only turn to
the pursuit of the secondary purpose after a realization bona fides in the
course of implementing a properly adopted business rescue plan that
the primary purpose is unattainable. This was one of the key issues that
the SCA had to confront in Oakdene Square Properties where the court
had to pronounce itself on whether a business rescue application under
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act could succeed where the
proposed rescue plan only provides for the pursuit of the so-called
secondary objective. In other words whether the requirement of
“rescuing the company” as contemplated in section 131(4)(a) is
satisfied where it is clear from the outset that there is no real chance
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) (S. Afr.).
Id. § 128(1)(b)(iii).
61 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 864-65; DELPORT,
supra note 7, at 445-47.
59
60
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of the company being saved from immediate liquidation and that the
best the stakeholders can hope for is a better return to creditors and
shareholders than that which would result from liquidation.62
Before the SCA, the respondents (who were creditors opposed
to the business rescue application) relied on the dictionary meanings
of the words “rescue” and “rehabilitate” to argue that the statutory
definition of “business rescue” in section 128(1)(b) contemplates
proceedings aimed at the rehabilitation of a company which in turn
requires that the proceedings must be aimed at achieving the primary
goal in section 128(1)(b)(iii), which is to restore the company to the
normal healthy state of solvency.63 In the respondents’ view, the socalled secondary objective, to provide a better deal for creditors and
shareholders than liquidation, can only be an alternative goal of the
proposed business rescue plan. Accordingly, they submitted that a
proposed plan, such as that in this case, that holds out no hope of a
return of the company to a state of solvency, but provides at best for
achievement of the secondary goal, does not amount to “rescuing the
company” as required by the Act.64
The SCA held that Chapter Six of the Act, in section 128(1)(b)
provides its own meaning for the terms “rescue” and “rehabilitate,”
neither of which coincide with the dictionary meanings of the words
upon which the respondents sought to rely. In the SCA’s view,
“business rescue” under the Act means “to facilitate ‘rehabilitation’
which in turn means the achievement of one of two goals: (a) to return
the company to solvency, or (b) to provide a better deal for creditors
than what they would receive through liquidation.”65 Accordingly, the
SCA concluded that the achievement of either one of the two goals

62 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 23 (S. Afr.).
63 In this respect, the respondents urged the court to endorse the approach
followed by the High Court in the earlier case of AG Petzetakis International Holdings
Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.).
64 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 25 (S. Afr.).
65 Id. ¶ 26.
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referred to in section 128(1)(b) qualify as “business rescue” under the
Chapter.66
The argument of the opposing creditors in Oakdene Square
Properties invited the court to adopt a narrow construction of the
meaning of “business rescue” under the 2008 Companies Act. If
accepted, such an interpretation would effectively limit the availability
of business rescue proceedings to those cases where there is at least a
reasonable prospect of the company being restored to continuation as
a going concern. Considering the policy goals and public interests
behind the enactment of South Africa’s business rescue scheme—
especially those pertaining to employment preservation and creation as
well as protection of vulnerable non-shareholder constituencies such
as employees, customers, and communities—the restriction of the
availability of business rescue only to those scenarios where there is at
least some chance of saving the debtor company as a going concern
would seem to be prima facie plausible. Indeed, it is arguable that the
primary public interest rationale behind law and policymakers’ decision
to establish the business rescue model is to make it available for use by
companies and stakeholders who find themselves with a financially
distressed company that has a chance of being restored to its status quo
prior to its financial woes.67
However, there are sound reasons why the SCA should be
applauded for shunning a narrow interpretation of the meaning of
“business rescue”—preferring instead to adopt a broad, generous
construction that will ensure the availability of the rescue provisions

Id.
The socio-economic policy goals and public interests at the heart of
modern statute-based corporate rescue schemes can be readily gleaned from the
pertinent primary and secondary sources, including the multiple reports issued or
commissioned by relevant government departments. See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64; CHAIRMAN SIR KENNETH CORK,
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, CMND
8558 (1982); SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, supra note 4;
Anneli Loubser, Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of a Home, 40 COMP.
INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 152, 152-54 (2007); MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 18-25.
66
67
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even in those scenarios where liquidation is inevitable.68 In the first
place, creditors and shareholders, as company stakeholders, are not
inherently undeserving of judicial sympathy and assistance when faced
with a debtor that has no reasonable prospect of survival as a solvent
going concern. Indeed, their role in the sustainable development of an
enabling environment for companies and entrepreneurs to thrive
cannot be overemphasized.69 Limiting the availability of business
rescue by excluding it from scenarios where there is only a likelihood
of creditors and shareholders receiving better returns than on
immediate liquidation would amount to adopting a statutory
interpretation that is patently hostile to these two groups of
stakeholders, both of whom are indispensable to the sustainable
growth and survival of the modern company. This is so because the
narrow definition for which the respondents argued in Oakdene Square
Properties amounted to stating that business rescue ought not to be
available where the primary beneficiaries will be creditors and
shareholders. Clearly, such anti-creditor, anti-shareholder
interpretation cannot be consistent with the underlying intention of
the legislature.70
Furthermore, as the SCA itself pointed out,71 a narrow
interpretation seeking to limit the availability of business rescue to
cases where there is a reasonable prospect of restoring the debtor
See Richard Bradstreet, Business Rescue Proves to be Creditor-Friendly: CJ
Claasen’s Analysis of the New Business Rescue Procedure in Oakdene Square Properties, 130
SALJ 44, 49-52 (2013).
69 See Bradstreet, supra note 11, at 195.
70 It should be recalled here that Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.)
specifically states that one of the objects of the Act is to provide for the efficient
rescue of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and
interests of “relevant stakeholders.” To the extent that creditors and shareholders are
“relevant stakeholders,” any interpretation of a provision of Companies Act 71 of
2008 Chapter Six that is hostile to their rights and interests without compelling
justification, including being necessary for the protection of other relevant
stakeholders’ interests, would actually be inconsistent with the legislative intent
encapsulated in the wording of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). To the
extent that the broad interpretation of the meaning of “business rescue” adopted by
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties is more consistent with the legislative
prescription to balance the various stakeholder rights and interests, such an
interpretation is highly plausible. See Bradstreet, supra note 68, at 49-52.
71 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd.
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 26 (S. Afr.).
68
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company to financial health as a going concern would be one that
effectively ignores the historical context out of which the Chapter Six
provisions originate. Central to that context is the “judicial
management” model. The pertinent provisions of the 1973 Companies
Act made the proper granting of a judicial management order
conditional upon a finding of a reasonable probability that implementation
of the order will result in the debtor regaining its ability to meet its
financial obligations in the normal course of things. As indicated
above, it is now widely acknowledged in both academic and judicial
commentaries that it was the narrow restrictive meaning attributed by
the judiciary to those key words that largely led to the abysmal failure
of judicial management and its replacement with the business rescue
model under the 2008 Companies Act. As the SCA concluded, it is
unlikely that the legislature would have intended to repeat the mistakes
of the past.72
C.

Status of the Tax and Public Revenue Collection Authorities
in Business Rescue Proceedings

The fascinating question of whether the South African
Revenue Service (“SARS”) enjoys special status in business rescue
proceedings, as a preferent creditor, has come before the court in
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v. Beginsel NO and Others.73 In
this case, SARS contended that there was no reason why it could not
have been specified as a preferent creditor in the proposed business
rescue plan seeing that section 150(2)(b) of the 2008 Companies Act
permits such a plan to create and specify the order of preference, in
which proceeds of property sold pursuant to the plan will be applied
subject to preferences conferred by the Act in section 135 upon
different classes of post-commencement creditors.74 The critical issue
for determination was whether SARS ought to be treated as a preferent
Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
74 In requiring that every business rescue plan contain all information
reasonably required to enable affected persons to decide whether or not to accept or
reject a plan, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 150(2)(b) (S. Afr.) prescribes a division of
the plan into three parts: Part A providing a background; Part B setting out the debt
and business restructuring proposals; and Part C setting out the assumptions and
conditions on which the plan is based. See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 516-21.
72
73
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creditor for purposes of reckoning its voting interest,75 as well as for
purposes of distributions of proceeds from disposals of company
property by the business rescue practitioner. In advancing its case,
SARS relied heavily on the provisions of sections 96 to 103 of the
Insolvency Act No. 24 of 193676 (“Insolvency Act”), arguing that it is
a preferent creditor whose claim ranks ahead of ordinary concurrent
creditors. Based on section 103(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, SARS
further contended that because ordinary concurrent creditors are
included in the class of concurrent creditors who would be
subordinated in a liquidation referred to in section 145(4)(b) and
because they would receive nothing on liquidation of the company in
the instant matter, they (ordinary concurrent creditors) had no voting
interest at the creditors’ meeting.77
According to the court, the meaning and practical implication
of the argument advanced by SARS is that while SARS, as preferent
unsecured creditor, would have had a voting interest equal to the value
of its claim against the company, the remainder of the (non-preferent)
concurrent creditors representing eighty-seven percent of all creditors
present at the particular meeting would have been disenfranchised
concurrent creditors under section 145(4)(b). The obvious and
inevitable result is that the vote of SARS alone would have ensured the
rejection of the business rescue plan notwithstanding the wishes of the
substantial majority of the creditors.78 The court held that the
construction of section 145(4) urged on it by SARS would lead to an
illogical result that would fail to balance the rights and interests of all
relevant stakeholders as envisaged in section 7(k) of the Act. In any
event, according to the court, that interpretation is contrary to the
ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in the provisions of
section 145(4). In the court’s view, it is “wholly inconsistent with the
Creditors of a debtor company are conferred with voting interests in
accordance with Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(j) (S. Afr.) read together with
Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 145(4) and (5) (S. Afr.). These provisions effectively
fix a creditor’s voting interest at the value of her claim against the company. Some
academic commentators have taken the view that, at least for this purpose, it is
immaterial whether a creditor’s claim is secured or unsecured. See CONTEMPORARY
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 903.
76 Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936 (S. Afr.), as amended.
77 Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).
78 Id. ¶ 21.
75
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purpose and scheme of the Act, to include all concurrent creditors
under s[ection] 145(4)(b) of the Act, thereby almost certainly having
their voting interests reduced and quite possibly entirely
emasculated.”79 In this regard, the court agreed with the authors of
Henochsberg80 that such an interpretation of section 145(4) is grossly
unfair to concurrent creditors, especially given that they have a greater
level of interest in the debtor company’s rescue than the secured
creditors who can fall back on their security interest if the attempt at
business rescue turned out to be a failure.81
The practical implications of judicial acceptance of the
principle advanced by SARS would have been devastating, not only for
non-preferent creditors generally, but also for the viability and
attractiveness of business rescue proceedings in scenarios where the
debtor company is substantially indebted to SARS. By adopting a legal
position that is consistent with the principles of fairness and equality
of creditors as against one that unduly places a particular creditor in a
dominant position by enabling it to wield a casting or controlling vote
(and thereby allowing it to predetermine the outcome of creditors’
meetings), the court clearly signalled its discomfort with positions of
legal principle that are certain to have the effect of undermining
inclusive and egalitarian character of the rescue scheme that the
legislature has established in Chapter Six of the Act. The court in SARS
v Beginsel deserves to be applauded in this regard considering the fact
that, under South Africa’s tax and insolvency laws and related
jurisprudence, granting preference to the claims or legal position of
SARS is the norm rather than the exception. In this respect it would
again have been easily defensible for the court to have aligned itself to
the claim for preference by SARS ostensibly in defense of the public
interest in maximizing legal protection of claims and monies owing to
the national fiscus. It was therefore bold and courageous for the court
to refuse preferential treatment for SARS in business rescue
proceedings. The practical significance of this legal position is
Id. ¶ 32.
DELPORT, supra note 7, at 509.
81 See Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others
2012 (1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 35 (S. Afr.); See also Okkie Blom & William Maodi,
Demoting
SARS,
WITHOUT
PREJUDICE
(Sept.
2013),
http://www.withoutprejudice.co.za/index.php/issues/item/demotingsars?category_id=1.
79
80
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enhanced by the likelihood that it will serve to discourage the granting
of preference to other state-related claims that may be outstanding
against debtor companies, such as monies due under municipal and
environmental legislation.
D.

Judicial Review and Setting Aside of Resolution of Board of
Directors Commencing Business Rescue

As indicated above, the board of a financially distressed
company may voluntarily place the entity under business rescue by
adopting a resolution to that effect.82 The Act provides recourse to
unhappy stakeholders by stipulating that an “affected person” may
apply to the court for an order setting aside the board’s resolution on
either one of three grounds:83
1. That there is no reasonable basis for believing that
the company is financially distressed;
2. That there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing
the company; or
3. That the company has failed to satisfy the
procedural requirements set out in section 129 of
the Act.
However, in adjudicating over an “affected person’s” challenge
against the board’s resolution, the Act provides that the resolution may
be set aside where, “having regard to all of the evidence, the court
considers that it is otherwise just and equitable to do so.” An
interesting and important question that arose in the case of DH Brothers
Industries84 was whether the above provision constituted an additional
(fourth) ground for invalidating the said resolution of the board on

82 It is required that the resolution be supported by a majority of the board.
Accordingly, the absence of clear and credible evidence that the majority of directors
were behind the resolution is fatal. See DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others
2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 16 (S. Afr.) (holding that adoption of the resolution by one
of two directors constituted a failure to satisfy the procedural requirements of section
129—which is one of the bases on which the resolution may be set aside).
83 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(1)(a) (S. Afr.).
84 DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.).
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which an “affected person” could rely.85 What seems apparent from
the text of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is that while the court is
empowered to set aside the board resolution on four grounds, an
“affected person” is only entitled to premise the application on one or
more of the three grounds. According to the court in the DH Brothers
Industries case, it would seem that “an application cannot be based on
this fourth ground because the application then would not qualify as
one brought in terms of section 130(1)(a).”86 Given that section
130(5)(a) essentially empowers the court to grant relief on a cause of
action which cannot, on its face, be relied upon by an applicant seeking
to set aside the board resolution in question, the court concluded that
the said provision creates an anomaly. Taking the view that “the
distinction between s 130(1)(a) and s 130(5)(a) clearly arises from a
drafting error,” the court in DH Brothers Industries held that, “the only
sensible meaning which avoids the absurdity which would otherwise
result is to construe the just-and-equitable basis as an additional
ground to the three listed in s 130(1)(a).”87 The result is that it can be
relied upon as a fourth ground or cause of action by an “affected
person” seeking relief under section 130(1)(a).88
Section 130(5)(a) specifically requires a court to consider all of
the evidence before reaching a decision on the just and equitable
ground. In the DH Brothers Industries case, the court held that the
following were factors that must be considered:


Whether the business rescue plan was properly
adopted; and



The terms of the plan and, in particular, whether it
contains any offensive provision.89

This issue was addressed by the court in DH Brothers Industries, 2014 (1)
SA 103, because the applicant-creditor specifically relied on the “just and equitable
provision” of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(5)(a)(ii) (S. Afr.).
86 Id.
87 Id. ¶ 18.
88 Id.
89 Id. ¶ 19. It is submitted that there are at least two additional factors that
courts should in this context recognize as relevant, namely: (a) whether there are any
real prospects of a successful rescue given the debtor-company’s circumstances; and
(b) whether there is any evidence of the directors acting mala fides.
85
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The manner in which the court in DH Brothers Industries
resolved the anomaly and potential conflict created by the provisions
of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is jurisprudentially significant in
more ways than one. First, the court’s decision effectively enlarged the
provisions of section 130(1)(a) by explicitly making available a fourth
additional ground that may be invoked by company stakeholders
seeking to prevent a financially distressed company from being
voluntarily placed under business rescue by its directors. Second, given
the omnibus, open-ended (catch-all), and amorphous nature of the
just-and-equitable ground, the decision in DH Brothers Industries
significantly strengthens the hands of creditors who comprise the
stakeholder group more likely to be opposed to business rescue while
similarly weakening the prospects of such a board resolution surviving
judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that, at least on the face of it, this
decision is not supportive of the institution of business rescue.
E.

Legality of Contents of Plan: Appropriateness and Validity of
a Provision Effecting Compulsory Cession of Part of
Creditors’ Claims

In the DH Brothers Industries case, part of the fact complex was
that the opposing creditor who sought an order setting aside the
board’s resolution placing the debtor company under business rescue
was owed a debt of approximately R 5,000,000, which was secured by
deeds of suretyship provided by the company’s two directors (who
were also the only shareholders). The plan put forward by the business
rescue practitioner provided for the creditor to (a) receive 12.25% of
the face value of its claim as a dividend; and (b) cede (transfer) 75.75%
of its claim to a share trust established for the exclusive benefit of the
company. The applicant creditor contended that, to the extent that the
plan provided for a compulsory cession of a substantial part of its
claim, it was not the kind of plan envisaged under the Act, especially
given that the applicant would be rendered unable to recover the ceded
portion of its claim from the directors who acted as sureties for the
company.90
It is noteworthy that none of the provisions of the now famous
Chapter Six speaks to the effect, if any, of business rescue proceedings
90

Id. ¶ 64.
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on the liability of persons who had in the period preceding the
commencement of the proceedings furnished deeds of suretyship on
the debtor company’s behalf.91 Interestingly, section 155(9) of the Act,
which is located in the same Chapter Six, specifically provides that the
adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect on
the liability of a person who is a surety of the company.92 In this
respect, the applicant submitted that, given that all creditors are bound
by an adopted plan irrespective of whether or not they voted in favor,
the legislature would have included a provision similar to section
155(9) if it had been within its contemplation that compulsory cessions
of creditors’ claims could properly form part of a business rescue plan.
With respect to compulsory partial or total forfeiture of
creditors claims and/or related rights, the court in DH Brothers Industries
noted that Chapter Six of the 2008 Companies Act only provided for
(a) partial deprivation or forfeiture on the part of creditors who
consented to the discharge of their debt in whole or in part93 and (b)
enforcement of pre-business rescue debts to the limited extent
permitted by the terms of an adopted rescue plan.94 Against the
background of these two provisions, the court held that “any provision
in a plan which goes beyond a voluntary discharge of the whole or part
of a debt is not competent.”95 After noting that the plan in this case
went far beyond what was permitted by the pertinent provisions of
sections 152 and 154 and emphasizing the well-established
presumption in South African law against any deprivation of rights by
legislation, the court concluded that “it must follow as night follows

Interestingly, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 155(9) (S. Afr.), which section
is located in the same Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.), specifically
provides that the adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect
on the liability of a person who is a surety of the company.
92 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.) consists of twenty-eight
sections laid out in five parts (A-E). It is interesting to note that only part E,
consisting of only one section, deals with the subject of “compromise between
company and creditors.”
93 See id. § 152(4).
94 Id. § 154(2).
95 DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para.
67 (S. Afr.).
91
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day that a plan which deprives non-acceding creditors of the right to
enforce a claim against a surety does not pass muster.”96
Most interestingly, this is one issue on which the court in DH
Brothers Industries agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of the
court in the earlier case of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd. v.
Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd.97 In the latter case, the applicant
creditor bank maintained that the fact that the board of the debtor
company resolved to place it under business rescue could not deprive
it of its right to pursue the directors as sureties pursuant to the
suretyships they provided in the period preceding commencement of
business rescue. However, the practitioner took a different view,
similar to that of the shareholders who happened to be the same
directors and sureties in question. Accordingly, the bank sought a
declaratory order that the adoption of a business rescue plan, with
respect to a company placed under business rescue, would not affect
the rights a creditor has under suretyships executed with respect to
amounts owed by the company under business rescue. The court held
that there was no express provision in Chapter Six providing that the
adoption of a business rescue plan will deprive creditors of the
company of their rights as against sureties for the company’s debts.98
The court concluded that there need be no connection between a
surety and either the company in financial distress or the stakeholders,
and that whether or not a creditor is entitled to pursue a surety will, in
the ordinary course, have no bearing on the prospects of rescuing the
company. Thus, in the court’s view, the interests of sureties do not fall
within the scope of the objectives of the business rescue regime. In
this regard, it relied on the sentiments of Rogers AJ in Investec Bank Ltd.
v. Bryuns,99 where the court decided that section 133 (2) explicitly
referred to the stay of suretyship undertaken by the company and not
a suretyship undertaken by a third person for the indebtedness of the
Id. ¶ 67.
African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty)
Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.).
98 Id. ¶¶ 68-69. The court also opined that: “If the legislature intended that
the adoption of a business rescue plan would have such a far-reaching consequence,
the legislature would have expressly provided for this consequence . . . . There is,
furthermore, no basis to suggest that such a provision could be read into the business
rescue regime.”
99 Investec Bank Ltd v. Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.).
96
97
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company. Accordingly, the court in African Banking Corporation held
that the adoption of the plan would not affect the opposing creditor
bank’s claim against the debtor company’s directors as sureties for the
debts of the company.
The overwhelmingly pro-creditor position and perspective
adopted by the courts in the three cases mentioned above are both
plausible and justifiable on a number of grounds. First, it prevents
abuse and opportunism in the context of business rescue proceedings.
This is because, as observed by the court in African Banking Corporation,
there is no functional link between the policy goal of ensuring success
for the process of rescuing a financially distressed company and the
continuation or cessation of the liability assumed by persons who
provided suretyships in support of the company’s pre-business rescue
debts. Allowing such sureties to essentially “free-ride” on the business
rescue proceedings to abandon their contractual obligations (as was
attempted by the two directors in DH Brothers Industries) smacks of
opportunism and unjust enrichment, which is the kind of conduct or
behavior that the courts are expected and indeed duty bound to
discourage.100 Second, it is required of the courts to strive to maintain
a careful balance between the relevant stakeholders’ interests in the
business rescue context.101 The development of jurisprudence that is
accepting of business rescue plan provisions aimed at advantaging
sureties by terminating their obligations under the suretyships merely
because the debtor company has been successfully placed under
business rescue inappropriately skews that balance against company
creditors and their interests. This is especially problematic given that
the impugned terms of the rescue plans in DH Brothers Industries and
African Banking Corporation sought to effectively negate existing
contractual rights of company creditors and actually did so in a manner
that was akin to “expropriation” of property rights without
compensation. Such jurisprudence does not belong in the corpus of
contemporary South African company law. Third, permitting terms in
100 Not surprisingly, the court in DH Brothers Industries found the provisions
of the business rescue plan aimed at the compulsory, non-consensual nullification of
the two shareholder-directors’ obligations under suretyships held by a number of the
creditors to be both offensive and constitute a basis on which it could be properly
concluded that it was “just and equitable” to set aside the proceedings. See DH
Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 68 (S. Afr.).
101 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.).
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business rescue plans that seek to, inter alia, terminate suretyship
obligations could undermine the integrity and credibility of the entire
corporate rescue regime by creating space and incentives for collusion
between business rescue practitioners and sureties aimed at improperly
benefiting the latter.
CONCLUSION
Prima facie, the fact that there have been significantly more
adverse judicial decisions on business rescue applications than those in
favor may be troubling for law and policy makers and their supporters
desperate to see the firm establishment of South Africa’s corporate
rescue model as well as the rapid entrenchment of a similarly
supportive judicial culture. Obviously, such a culture would be one that
is hostile to the idea of liquidating companies that have the slightest
prospects of rehabilitation, especially where, as in DH Brothers Industries,
there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith on the part of either the
business rescue practitioner or the “affected persons” supporting the
business rescue plan.102 Shareholders, employees, trade unions, and the
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission are certain to be
among those stakeholders already getting concerned about the very
poor success rate of business rescue applications thus far.
This apparently poor start to the tenure of Chapter Six can be
considered problematic from another perspective, namely, that it may
lead to the proliferation of a perception among stakeholders that the
courts are generally not supportive of, or favorably disposed toward,
business rescue applications. This perception may in turn create a
chilling effect through the under-utilization of the mechanism due to
the emergence of widespread belief that applications for business
rescue proceedings by “affected persons” are not worth the inevitable
investment of time and resources because of their limited prospects of
success. Perhaps more importantly, the resulting decline in enthusiasm
and support for the business rescue mechanism could significantly

In this respect the unmistakeable pro-rescue disposition of the courts
in India is of great interest and, from a South African perspective, probably worth
emulating. See Kristin Van Zwieten, Corporate Rescue in India: The Influence of the Courts,
1 J. CORP. L. STUD. (Forthcoming 2015).
102
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undermine the prospects of Chapter Six achieving the socio-economic
public policy goals intended for it by the legislature.
However, it is arguable that, notwithstanding the fact that the
courts’ decisions on business rescue applications have been generally
negative, the rulings and interpretive positions they have taken on most
of the pivotal questions and issues can be said to be business rescuefriendly and therefore supportive of the future development of the
mechanism. In this respect, the decisions and reasoning in the cases of
Oakdene Square Properties, Beginsel NO v. SARS, and African Banking
Corporation should be applauded in the hope that courts will
enthusiastically follow them in future cases.
Finally, judgments are also beginning to clearly show that there
are significant gaps in the framework and provisions of Chapter Six in
terms of both the omission to make express provisions on what are
important and foreseeable business rescue-related issues and the poor
drafting quality of those provisions.103 The result is that in the coming
years South Africa is likely to see sharply contrasting judicial decisions
as already appears from cases dealing with the question of “reasonable
prospect of rescue.” Accordingly, for the early years of the regime’s
implementation, company stakeholders, business rescue practitioners,
and their legal advisers will have to contend with a significant degree
of uncertainty in this area of contemporary South African company
law.104

103
This has come out most starkly in the context of the litigation around
the “binding offer” provisions of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1)(b) (S. Afr.) in
the two cases of African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers
(Pty) Ltd. and Others, 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.) and DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz
NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S.Afr.). In the latter case, Gorven, J. lamented the
drafting-related weaknesses of the Chapter Six provisions in no less than two
paragraphs of his judgment.
104
See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 5 (predicting, two years before the 2008
Companies Act came into operation, that it will pose multiple problems that are likely
to “cause uncertainty in its application”); Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue
Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2), 4 J. SOUTH
AFRICAN L. 689, 701 (2010) (calling for legislative intervention by way of amendment
of the pertinent provisions as a matter of urgency because of “the many unclear,
confusing and sometimes alarming provisions.”).
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